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Visual Reasoning: I see what you mean 
Michael A R Biggs 
 
Abstract. This paper is a study of examples of visual reasoning from Wittgenstein. There are 
two key issues. First, to what extent are some lexical concepts predicated on visual 
examples? Cases of ostensively defined nouns such as ‘red’ are less interesting in this 
context than cognitive terms such as ‘to show’ [proof]. Second, I identify examples where an 
unclear relationship subsists between the visual and the lexical, including visual concepts 
with fuzzy boundaries that are normally supposed to be the province of lexical concepts. The 
target is the preconception that concepts may be comprehensively described either visually 
or lexically and to problematize the discrimination between metaphorical and non-
metaphorical communication. 
 
 
 
Visual reasoning: I see what you mean 
 
 
Some terms are defined in words, for example ‘bachelor’ is defined as ‘unmarried adult 
male’. There are examples of ‘bachelors’ to which we can point. These examples alone 
would not suffice to define the term bachelor since it is one particular attribute of the example 
to which we wish to draw attention. Other lexically defined terms may not have 
corresponding examples in the world of experience, for example ‘unicorns’. The lack of 
concrete examples does not affect our ability to clearly define such terms. 
 
Some terms cannot be defined lexically, for example ‘red’. These terms may be defined by 
reference to samples. The paradigm is ostensive definition, in which we point to a sample 
and utter the phrase ‘this is red’. The phrase takes the function of attaching the name to the 
sample and the composite action may constitute a definition. Not all ostensive acts constitute 
definitions, for example ‘this is a bachelor’. In particular, ostensive definitions are used with 
regard to first-person phenomenological experiences such as colour experiences. 
 
Some terms can be defined lexically, but have their roots in practice and hence in 
phenomenological experience, for example ‘proof’. I could use the rules of arithmetic or logic 
to prove that 2+3=5,1 but I might prefer to show you that 2+3=5 by using beans or groups of 
lines on a page. This paper examines how diagrams are used in relation to terminological 
definition, and concentrates on this last group as symptomatic of terms with 
phenomenological foundations. 
                                                                 
1 cf. Russell and Whitehead Principia Mathematica. 
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Definitions 
 
I want to differentiate between two uses of diagrams: illustration and demonstration. The first 
is characterised by a passive role. When a diagram is used to illustrate something that is also 
described in an accompanying text, the diagram can be removed without making the 
document incomprehensible. A paradigm is Euclid’s Elements. This comprises a series of 
proofs or demonstrations of geometrical theorems. Although the standard text includes 
diagrams, and the demonstrations contain geometrical constructions, it is not the case that 
the diagrammatic constructions prove the theorems. In order to refute Euclid one would have 
to refute the reasoning that is contained in the text, not the appearance of the diagram. The 
diagrams illustrate what is logically demonstrated, albeit in a complex form, in the text. The 
theorems of Euclid establish the logic of space, not the phenomenology of space. 
[315] 
 
Stepping beyond the lexical 
 
The verbal definition, as it takes us from one verbal definition to another, in a sense 
gets us no further. In the ostensive definition however we seem to make a much more 
real step towards learning the meaning.2 
 
Ostension is a combination of a visual practice, i.e. pointing to a phenomenon, and a lexical 
or verbal practice, i.e. uttering the phrase ‘this is X’. This combination appears to offer a route 
into the world of phenomena and experience. Unfortunately, there is a fundamental criticism 
of this practice as constitutive of a definition. The criticism is that the practice begs the 
question, that is, one has to adopt a tacit definition of that which is to be defined in order to 
perform the ostension. Let me unpack this further. 
 
Before the ostensive act can be performed a judgement must first be made as to, for 
example, the redness of the sample. This judgement is the judgement of similarity of colour. 
But how are we to determine what is similar if we are in genuine need of the ostensive 
definition of the word ‘red’? First, it is necessary in the ostensive definition to know what 
category of object is being defined. In the definition of the word ‘red’ by using a red patch as 
a sample, it must be understood that it is the colour and not, for example, the form of the 
patch which is being defined. Second, the abstract concept of colour is required to be 
                                                                 
2 Wittgenstein The Blue Book  p.1. 
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understood if this distinction is itself to be understood. But how is the abstract concept of 
colour to be communicated if it is a clarifying concept for the communication of a substantive 
such as ‘red’. It is not clear whether an understanding of the abstract must precede or 
necessarily succeeds the ostensive definition. The abstract must be lexically defined as an 
inference from otherwise ostensively or phenomenologically defined elements. However, as 
we have seen, an understanding of those elements requires an understanding of the abstract 
which describes the category being ostensively defined. The argument is circular. 
 
This circular argument occurs in what has become known as the Paradigm Case Argument. 
What is assumed to indicate the category of that which is being defined is the accompanying 
gesture. This gesture can indicate in a number of ways. In the paradigm case of colour-word 
definition, the red patch is pointed at during the process of definition. The deictic gesture has 
a spatio-temporal component and so has the red patch, but which of the spatio-temporal 
elements is being indicated? This ambiguity is recognised by Wittgenstein3 but it is also 
conceded that the definition need not be misunderstood on that account4. But gesturing, if 
not ostensive definition, often accompanies definitive statements. Consider a musician 
raising a finger during a piece of music and saying ‘that is high-C’.5 This is an example of a 
spatio-temporal gesture of pointing to an intangible ‘object’. In these examples we see not 
only the logical limitations, but the extent to which the phenomenally substantiating gesture 
can encompass metaphorical ‘pointing’. 
 
 
Visual paradigms 
 
 
The part-visual approach of ostensive definition may be contrasted with fully visual 
diagrammatic demonstration. Thus we might demonstrate that 2+3=5 by drawing groups of 
lines on a page. Wittgenstein uses this technique to reconsider aspects of mathematical 
proof. He suggests that a proof is ‘a single pattern’.6 and that ‘the proof serves as a picture 
of the experiment’.7 
 
                                                                 
3 Philosophical Investigations  §28. 
4 ibid. §87. 
5 Waismann The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy 105. 
6 Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics-I §28. 
7 ibid. I §36. 
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A rectangle can be made of two parallelograms and two triangles. Proof.8 
 
In such a fully visual case it would be sufficient to add QED to the illustration. 
 
Categorical ambiguity 
 
How can we point to the colour of a book rather than its shape? In a particular circumstance 
we might change the accompanying form of words, ‘this colour is red’ or ‘this shape is a 
rectangle’. It may be obvious from the employment of a colour-word such as ‘red’ that it is the 
colour which is being pointed at, rather than the shape. But both of these examples suppose 
an understanding that ‘red’ is a colour-word or that the employment of a colour-word signifies 
the exclusion of shape descriptors. It would be tempting to assume that what determines the 
quality being pointed at is some form of intention on the part of the speaker. For the person 
learning from the definition this will involve a certain amount of guessing, or for the definer, of 
meaning something or attending to something.9 But an accompanying intention or meaning 
is Wittgenstein’s target. 
 
‘I meant something definite by it, when I said...’ ‘Did you mean something different 
when you said each word, or did you mean the same thing throughout the whole 
sentence?’ It is strange, though: you can mean something by each word and the 
combination of them can still be nonsense!10 
       
The temptation to look for an accompanying meaning in the ostensive definition cannot be 
denied. It must be massaged away like so many other philosophical puzzlements. The 
essence, as Baker and Hacker say, is that 
 
pointing North and saying ‘That is North’ is a correct explanation of North. 11 
                                                                 
8 ibid. I §50. 
9 Philosophical Investigations  §32. 
10 Philosophical Grammar §I-66. 
11 An Analytical Commentary on Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations  88. 
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What emerges is not that there is any explicable accompaniment to an ostensive definition. 
Rather the ways in which the definition might be validated, together make criteria or a 
practice for the application of words. Thus if we wish to explain the use of the word ‘red’ we 
can point to a pillar-box or to a colour sample and we can say ‘this is red’ or ‘this, and things 
of this colour, are called red’. That the group of users agree that such an action counts as a 
criterion of understanding of the use of the word red constitutes the definition, and nothing 
else. What is the same colour, or what it is about the pillar-box that is red, is not contained in 
the ostensive definition. The judgement of similarity itself is not as self-evident or inevitable 
as is commonly supposed. 
 
Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as 
a ‘proto-phenomenon’. That is, where we ought to have said: this language-game is 
played.12 
   
In contrast to the part-visual example of ostension, a fully-visual example has no implication 
of further hidden explanations. Wittgenstein saw numerical proof being essentially visual or a 
graphical activity. The issue about number is not whether 2+3=5, but if we wanted to prove it, 
what sort of thing would we do that would provide some sort of ultimate demonstration. This 
is where Wittgenstein had an extended notion of a 
[316] 
paradigm which was not just a typifying example but a normative model [Bild].13 It is 
normative because the visual demonstration is a comprehensive response to the question 
‘does 2+3=5?’ Arithmetic proof is fully-visual. 
 
Visual methods 
 
The lack of a prescriptive diagrammatic grammar for fully-visual examples alters the range of 
methods available for interpretation. In particular, close reading is modified. In textual 
analysis, close reading involves the detailed scrutiny of individual words and other forensic 
clues in the text. This is possible because the text itself is written in a natural language and 
terms can be de-contextualised so that all possible interpretations of them are brought to 
bear, thus broadening previous interpretations of the scope of the text in question. 
 
                                                                 
12 Philosophical Investigations  §654. 
13 cf. Biggs, M. ‘Interpreting Wittgenstein’s Graphics’ 
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A rare application of close reading to diagrams can be found in the interpretation of 
engineering drawings that conform to standardised specifications. In these cases, close 
reading might identify a line type as signifying one of several qualities and an outline figure 
appearing in several views might indicate flat or curved surfaces, etc. Indeed close reading is 
the only technique appropriate to reading a previously unseen drawing, and in particular for 
solving ambiguous representational problems such as those presented in examinations to 
engineering students. 
 
The close reading method may be contrasted with the contextual reading method. In the 
latter the reader’s experience of the author’s other works leads to a preferential interpretation 
of words, phrases and diagrams. The contextual method does not solve the problem of new 
use or establishing a first use that later influences contextual reading elsewhere, i.e. how 
does one establish the interpretation of a first occurrence? However in the majority of cases 
of diagrammatic interpretation, contextual reading is an essential method. 
 
Saying and showing 
 
Wittgenstein used the close reading method to identify a part-visual explanation of meaning. 
In Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, he introduces, and differentiates between, the concepts of 
saying and showing.14 These terms are used in relation to logical propositions. What a 
proposition says is what it asserts about its contents, e.g. ‘it is raining’. What it says might 
therefore be either true or false. What the proposition shows is the possibility of what it 
asserts. Therefore a grammatically well-formed proposition shows that there is a possibility of 
the assertion independently of whether the proposition is true or false. Propositions that are 
not well-formed show this when compared to syntactic rules. Wittgenstein hoped that a 
systematic analysis of the form of propositions would reveal whether they were able to show 
anything. However to be useful the method would apply to the analysis of content rather than 
form because it is possible to create well-formed but meaning less propositions and these 
are the misleading propositions in ordinary language. This is one of the main differences 
between Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and the later Philosophical Investigations, in that in 
the early work there is a confidence that a form of analysis will reveal the lack of content 
whereas in the later work it is recognised that meaning is socially determined.  
 
                                                                 
14 Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus  §§4.12-4.1212 
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The implementation of the analysis of showing and saying to visual reasoning is most easily 
demonstrated in representational diagrams. In these there needs to be sufficient visual cues 
to indicate that the diagram represents a three-dimensional externally existing object and to 
overcome any categorical ambiguity. This introduces syntactic rules that facilitate close 
reading. 
 
 
  
 
 
What these sample figures15 show are rigid mechanisms and thereby what they are able to 
say is, given the disposition of these rigid parts there would be a resultant movement of 
some kind. The first is used to describe the function of an hypothesis by analogy to gears. 
The second is used to describe how a sentence may appear to have meaning but in practice 
does not, by analogy to a mechanism that appears to function but does not. 
  
Close reading reveals that there are two levels to the concept of showing. The first is that 
both form and content are relevant to lexical and visual constructions. The second is that 
meaning-content  cannot be inferred from well-formedness. One outcome of this analysis in 
relation to visual reasoning is the discrimination of form from content and within that to 
discriminate two types of content. This is novel because in the normal discrimination of form 
from content, only one type of content is assumed, i.e. positive content. However, the sample 
figures say that non-content could also come from well-formedness. In other words, in visual 
reasoning, well-formedness is assumed to be an indicator of meaningful content.  
 meaningful 
content 
meaningless 
content 
well-formed true true 
not well-formed false true 
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One difficulty with the concept of showing is how something shows. The lexical concept of a 
proposition showing its logical possibility is a matter of understanding the grammar, which is 
why it functions well in relation to the strictly regular form of logical propositions. There is a 
similar clarity of the use of conventions in three-dimensional visualisations where notions of 
perspective might be seen as equivalent to syntax. In less conventionalised diagrammatic 
representations an interpretational framework may have to be inferred from a contextual 
reading. Without a socially determined framework, we can only postulate a metaphorical 
connection between the diagram and the interpretation. By metaphor I here mean that the 
expression/diagram may not mean literally what it says/depicts. The relationship between 
well-formedness, metaphor and 
[317] 
meaningful content remains to be clarified. 
 
Case Study 
 
  
this  fits  this. 
 
This sample expression16 is an assertion. The assertion relates to the particular instance of 
these two fork shapes. The key concept is one of ‘fitting’. It could be regarded as either a 
practical demonstration that X fits Y or an ostensive definition by example that ‘fitting’ is what 
these shapes do. We will use our visual judgement to determine whether they do or do not 
fit. 
 
 ‘Fit’ is here a somewhat loose concept since it normally requires a degree of controlled 
contiguity. Thus in engineering we speak of degrees of fitting corresponding to the degree of 
tightness or looseness. Wittgenstein’s example does not seem to require such specificity and 
could only result in an approximate congruity. The assertion of fit may therefore be 
metaphorical. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
15 Wittgenstein Philosophical Grammar pp.225 & 194. 
16 Wittgenstein The Bergen Electronic Edition Oxford University Press, 1999, MS159 31v. First published in: ‘Ursache und 
Wirkung: Intuitives Erfassen / Cause and Effect: Intuitive Awareness’  Philosophia 6, 441. Reprinted in: Wittgenstein 
Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951  Cambridge: Hackett, 1993, 422. 
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What we have is a situation where, if the images could be brought together in a particular 
orientation and overlapped we could establish minimum conditions for the use of the word 
‘fit’. The extent to which this can be made specific is the extent to which this example 
becomes less metaphorical. It allows for a fuzzy boundary to which additional conditions 
might be necessary before further cases can be identified. It is not therefore definitive 
although it may be paradigmatic, that is, ‘fit’ may be a concept with foundations in fully-visual 
practice. 
 
This use of visualisation is unusual. Visual language is commonly regarded as being ill 
equipped to express fuzzy concepts. In particular, modifiers such as logical constants and 
conditionals, e.g. some X do not fit Y, are not available. Visual conventions for expressing 
negatives, such as crossing-out, are used, e.g. road signs on leaving French towns, but the 
syntactic combination of signifiers is rare or limited. However, the example from Wittgenstein 
offers further scope for investigation of the relationship between the diagram and the concept 
of visual reasoning or explanation. 
 
We use a paradigm as an exemplar but not as a definition. This introduces a certain generality 
to the content-model that is a feature of concept like ‘red’ but not of the concept ‘one metre in 
length’. The philosophical, rather than commonplace, problem of generality finds expression in 
everyday concepts such as ‘getting noticeably longer’.17 The problem only becomes a 
philosophical one when we seek specific boundaries to the transition from quantity a to quantity 
b. 
 
It is not the case that the logic of mathematical concepts is defined by diagrams but that these 
examples show the fundamentally phenomenological foundations of our mathematical 
grammar. They show what we mean by correct inference, which is in turn bound up with our 
concept of the continuity of physical objects. 
 
                                                                 
17 Wittgenstein Philosophical Grammar 237. 
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This is how our children learn sums; for one makes them put down three beans and 
then another three beans and then count what is there. If the result at one time were 
5, at another 7... then the first thing we said would be that beans were no good for 
teaching sums.18 
 
This comparison with practice is reinforced by Wittgenstein's thought-experiment of the tribe 
who calculate the price of a heap of wood by the area covered by the heap rather than the 
volume of wood.19 In other words they ignore the height. We would say they do not calculate 
consistently, but our concept of accuracy is bound up with our concept of three-dimensionality 
and value according to quantity. However, we do not always apply such a framework of 
calculation to monetary value. For example, we often calculate salaries not on the basis  of 
quantity of work done (e.g. wood stacked), but on the basis of hours consumed or the age or 
gender of the worker. 
 
So how does this generalised content-model of a paradigm affect our interpretation of 
diagrams in relation to text? Appropriately chosen paradigms give us the opportunity of seeing 
connections, of having perspicuous representations of our concepts. Seeing connections is 
fundamental.20 It readily contributes to contextual reading which is the principal method of 
diagrammatic interpretation. Given the generality of the paradigm: that it is a particularly 
apposite example but not itself constitutive of a definition. It allows us to see beyond the 
ostensive definition provided by the sample, to the broader way in which visualisation might act 
normatively for further applications. That which is exposed as metaphorical is the relationship 
between words and concepts in cases where we would illustrate our interpretation with a 
diagram, but would need to say or write something too. The ability to demonstrate without 
words shows us something about the nature of such concepts. 
 
Summary 
  
One test for the fundamentally visual nature of a concept is to differentiate between 
diagrammatic explanations that are illustrations and diagrammatic explanations that are 
demonstrations. All ostensive definitions would count as trivial examples of demonstration 
since they are incontestably visual, not because the concept being described is necessarily 
visual, but because the ostensive method is partly-visual, i.e. the deictic gesture. 
 
                                                                 
18 Philosophical Investigations  §37. 
19 Ibid. §149. 
20 Ibid. §122. 
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Of greater consequence is the identification of fully-visual concepts. These do not require 
conventionalised representational grammars such as engineering drawing to facilitate their 
interpretation. They are unusual because they can be reliably interpreted by contextual 
reading. They demonstrate fuzzy boundaried concepts and generality. As a result, they 
expose the inability of ostensive definition to function normatively. 
[318] 
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